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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While respondents1 statement of facts is generally 
accurate, it contains several assertions that are either 
immaterial or incorrect. For example, in an effort to evoke 
sympathy for Baird and his wife, respondents attempt to show 
that Territorial Savings & Loan ("TSL") was "oversecured" on its 
loan to the Bairds and somehow treated the Bairds unfairly 
during the Hawaii foreclosure proceedings. (Resp. Br. at 3, 
6.) Those claims are, of course, immaterial to this garnishment 
proceeding. Even if relevant, the record would in fact show 
that Baird1s financial disclosures to TSL prior to the loan were 
false and misleading. (See, e.g., listing of Idria Mine as 
worth over $1 million when it was actually only a worthless and 
illegal tax shelter, Appellant's Br., Add. 44, 56, 58.) Thus, 
respondents1 attempts to whitewash Baird at this point are 
unavailing. 
Respondents state that, contemporaneous with creation of 
the KOA Trust, "Baird signed promissory notes" to his wife and 
children as evidence of prior debts and services to Baird. 
(Resp. Br. at 4.) The truth is that Baird1s son John Knapp 
Baird, the Trustee, signed those promissory notes on behalf of 
the trust. (See Trust Agreement p. 2, Appellant's Br., Add. 46, 
and promissory notes, R. 633, Tab 7.) There is no evidence of 
any debts running from Baird to his wife and children other than 
the self-serving recitals in the trust agreement. (See 
Appellant's Br. at 3, 15-18.) 
Respondents concede that Baird disregarded the trust by 
continuing to receive lease payments and to make mortgage 
payments regarding the nursing facility after creation of the 
trust. (Resp. Br at 6.) Baird did not direct the lease 
payments to be made to the trust until approximately June of 
1986, after TSL had foreclosed on the loan and began pursuing 
the deficiency. (Appellant's Br. at 3-4.) Moreover, contrary 
to respondents' assertion, the trust agreement does not 
authorize Baird, as trustor, to make the mortgage payments on 
the nursing facility or to receive reimbursement therefor. That 
arrangement applied only to the "Exhibit C" obligations 
supposedly owing to Baird's family and friends. (Appellant's 
Br., Add. 47, 55.) 
Finally, respondents argue that the facts contained in 
the Trustee's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment And In Support Of Trustee's Motion For Summary 
Judgment (R. 140) must be deemed admitted because of TSL's 
claimed noncompliance with Third District Rule 3(h) requiring 
specific controversion of those facts. (Resp. Br. at 8.) 
However, TSL substantially complied with the rule by 
specifically refuting the Trustee's statement of facts 
throughout its Reply Memorandum (R. 292). In view of the 
detailed and documented statement of facts in TSL's own 
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memorandum in support of summary judgment (R. 92), the aim of 
the rule to expose and highlight material issues of fact was 
achieved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
TSL challenged in the district court the validity of the 
non-mortgage debts assigned to the trust, and also raised the 
actual fraud claim in the district court (Points I and IV). 
Respondents have failed to show that they are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the trust-for-benefit claim 
(Point II). Respondents have also failed to show the 
nonexistence of material issues of fact requiring trial of the 
constructive and actual fraud claims (Points III and IV). 
Finally, Respondents1 Brief highlights the disputes and district 
court errors in applying the standards and burdens of proof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; TSL DISPUTED IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE VALIDITY OF 
BAIRDfS NON-MORTGAGE DEBTS PURPORTEDLY ASSUMED BY 
THE TRUST. 
Respondents argue that TSL is precluded from disputing 
the validity of the non-mortgage debts assumed by the trust 
It is interesting to note that the Trustee's own 
memorandum opposing TSL's motion for summary judgment also fails 
to "refer with particularity to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies and [to] state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed." 
Third District Rule 3(h); see R. 140. In any event, 
respondents failed to raise this argument in their reply 
memorandum to the district court (R. 374), and there is no 
indication that the district court relied on local rule 3(h) in 
entering its judgment. 
-3-
because TSL filed no affidavits countering those filed by the 
Trustee. (Resp. Br. at 11-14.) This argument relies on a 
strained and distorted reading of U.R.Civ.P. 56(e). That rule 
requires affidavits to "be made on personal knowledge." The 
only persons with personal knowledge of supposed "debts" between 
Baird and his family are Baird and his family. It is absurd to 
argue that TSL was required to obtain counter affidavits from 
Baird and his family, the very people benefitting from the 
challenged scam. Moreover, Rule 56(e) expressly permits 
affidavits to be opposed, not only by other affidavits, but also 
"by depositions." A motion for summary judgment is decided on 
the basis of the entire record, not simply affidavits. See 
Rule 56(c); Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright 
& Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (opposing affidavits 
not always required to avoid summary judgment); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 
1983) (motion may be opposed by "responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e)"). 
TSLfs memorandum opposing the Trustee's motion for 
summary judgment relies on the depositions of Baird and his son 
the Trustee to demonstrate that the "debts" to Baird1s family 
are not bona fide, and that there was never any intent of 
repaying the debts to Baird's friends. TSL's memorandum 
established, among other things, that there was never any record 
of the claimed family debts and services and no expectation or 
promise of payment; the family "debts" are fixed in nice round 
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figures totaling the precise difference between the value of the 
nursing facility and the amount of the nonfamily debts; the 
nonfamily "Exhibit C" creditors were never notified of the 
transfer of their debts and have received no payments on those 
debts; other than the necessary mortgage payments, all monies 
from the trust have gone to Baird and his family; and while 
Baird is authorized to receive reimbursement from the trust for 
payments he makes on the non-mortgage debts, the Trustee keeps 
no record of those payments or the resulting obligation to 
Baird. (R. 295-99, 304-14; see also Appellant's Br. at 3-5, 
16-20.) 
Thus, TSL sufficiently disputed the validity of the 
non-mortgage debts to create an issue of fact for the jury. A 
jury could reasonably find that the family "debts" were not 
genuine, but were created out of thin air to give the appearance 
of consideration and to keep the trust income in the family. 
See Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056 (1932) 
(conveyance to relative invalid because antecedent debt not 
genuine); 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances §155. 
POINT II: THE TRUST-FOR-BENEFIT STATUTE, SECTION 25-1-11, 
APPLIES TO THE CONVEYANCES IN THIS CASE TO VOID 
BAIRDfS TRUST. 
1. Respondents argue that section 25-1-11, voiding 
trusts made for the use and benefit of the grantor, does not 
apply to Baird*s conveyance of the nursing facility because the 
section does not expressly include real property. (Resp. Br. 
at 15-16.) Respondents did not raise this defense in the 
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district court (R. 378-88) and are therefore barred from raising 
it on appeal. Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & 
Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). 
The reason respondents did not raise the defense below is 
that it has no merit. In Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 
(Utah 1975), this Court rejected the argument that section 
25-1-11 applies only to personal property: 
The statue is but a codification of the common law, which 
for reasons discussed herein, refused to give recognition 
to trusts of this character involving any kind of 
property. [Id. at 1244.] 
The Court there concluded that because both real and personal 
property had been conveyed into the challenged trust, section 
25-1-11 applied. That construction is supported by the language 
of the statute, which includes all conveyances by "deeds," since 
deeds are typically used to transfer only real property. 
Black's Law Dictionary p. 373 (5th ed. 1979). 
In any event, Baird conveyed to the trust not only the 
nursing facility, but the leasehold interest as well 
(Appellant's Br., Add. 45), which is considered personalty. 
See Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc. v. Tax Commission, 4 
Utah 2d 236, 291 P.2d 895, 897 (1955); 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord 
and Tenant §7. Moreover, it is the payments on the leasehold 
interest that TSL seeks to garnish. Therefore, section 25-1-11 
plainly applies in this case. 
2. Respondents argue that Baird1s trust is not void 
under section 25-1-11 because the trust benefits only Baird's 
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payments are not, by the terms of the trust, exempt from 
creditor attachment, as a practical matter creditors have no way 
of knowing if and when such amounts are due and owing. The 
Trustee keeps no records, and, as occurred in this case, if a 
creditor does serve a writ of attachment the Trustee simply 
denies owing money to Baird. What Baird has created is a 
deceptive master "shell game" for his creditors, a game which, 
under the law, creditors are not required to play. 
The cases cited by respondents do not support their 
position. Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 
1978), upheld a trust created for the payment of a certain 
creditor, but only because there was no provision for any 
payments to the settlor. All deposits to the trust were 
irretrievably beyond the reach or benefit of the settlor. 
Eskelson v. Inter-County Title Guar. & Mort. Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 
27 (1960), is a trial court decision that does not even involve 
a trust. The other two New York cases cited state the rule of 
that jurisdiction that a trust is void only if "wholly" for the 
benefit of the grantor, thus permitting "incidental" benefits. 
Utah has no such rule, and even if it did, it would not apply 
here because Baird's benefits go far beyond the incidental. The 
other Utah cases cited by respondents do not involve section 
25-1-11. Respondents cite no case upholding the transfer into 
trust of $500,000 worth of equity for the benefit of the grantor 
and his family; there is none. 
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status); Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(Utah 1977) (promissory note adequate to prove creditor status). 
Moreover, the definition of "creditor" in section 25-1-1, 
which respondents ignore, is clearly broad enough to include 
TSL, and makes no mention of adequacy of security as an element 
to be considered. See Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 
513, 516 (1935) (classifying tort claimant as creditor even 
prior to entry of judgment). As this Court recently stated in 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987): 
Given the purpose of the [Fraudulent Conveyance] Act, 
§25-1-1 should be construed with liberality so as to 
reach all artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act 
of its full force and effect in .preventing debtors from 
paying the just claims of their creditors. 
2 
TSL easily satisfies the required creditor status in this case. 
B. Lack of Fair Consideration 
The two sub-elements of fair consideration, fair equivalent 
exchange and good faith, both raise material issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Respondents have failed to show that a 
jury could not reasonably find either element of fair consideration 
to be lacking. 
2
 McMillan v. McMillan, 42 Idaho 270, 245 P. 98 
(1926), cited by respondents (Resp. Br. at 24-25), does not hold 
that adequate security negates creditor status; rather, the 
adequacy of other security merely evidences lack of fraudulent 
intent. _Id. at 99. 
Contrary to respondents' attempted distinction of Ogden 
State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765 (1895) (Resp. Br. 
at 25-26), that case is "still good law" because the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act merely codified existing law. See Zuniga v. 
Evans, supra, 48 P.2d at 516-17. 
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3 Reasonable jurors may not consider that "fair ," 
3 
Respondents repeatedly cite Givan v. Lambeth, 
Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 963 ( 1 9 6 C ) / as condoning infcrra. and 
secretive intra-family transactions Resp, Br. at ]3 29, 
31.) However, the language cited from Givan is ih-*" ct the 
defendant debtor, not the Court. Moreover, • h>-* : :; - ;e of the 
genuineness of the family debts was decided v a v not by 
the judge on a summary judgment: moJ \ *~ ':-> 
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2. Good Faith 
Respondents cover seven pages of their brief attempting 
to refute all the indicia of bad faith present in this case. 
(Resp. Br. at 31-38.) The attempt merely illustrates and 
confirms the sharp differences in how reasonable persons may 
view the same evidence. Clearly, the issue of good faith is 
both material and disputed. The district court had no business 
resolving it without a trial. 
Respondents attempt to dodge the good faith question by 
arguing that where there is an equivalent exchange there is also 
good faith. (Resp. Br. at 31, 37.) However, analysis of the 
two elements may not be lumped together; both raise a jury 
question and both must be satisfied independently to find fair 
consideration. Absent conclusive, undisputed evidence on good 
faith, there could be no finding of fair consideration, 
regardless of the degree of equivalency of the exchange. 
E.g., In re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 868 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1987). 
Thus, in view of the conflicting evidence on equivalency 
of the exchange and good faith, the district court erred in 
awarding summary judgment on the constructive fraud claim. 
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137-38.) TSL's supporting memorandum challenges the conveyance 
under the entire Act, again without limitation to a particular 
section or theory. (R. 92-93.) The remaining memoranda of the 
parties document the full discovery and discuss the complete 
facts and law pertaining to the actual fraud and other theories 
under the Act. Thus, the actual fraud claim was raised and 
litigated, if not expressly then by the "implied consent of the 
parties." U.R.Civ.P. 15(b). At no time did TSL ever disclaim 
or abandon the actual fraud claim. The quote on page 40 of 
Respondents' Brief discusses the constructive fraud claim. 
Not only was the actual fraud claim raised by the 
parties, it was actually decided by the district court. The 
court's Order Re: Summary Judgment recites without limitation or 
exclusion: 
The central issue presented involves whether there was a 
fraudulent conveyance and transfer into trust of certain 
real property by the defendant John N. Baird, and whether 
the court should set aside the conveyance under the Utah 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. [Appellant's Br., Add. 1-2.] 
The Order then lists the specific claims of TSL, including the 
actual fraud claim: 
Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was in violation of 
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act in that allegedly: 
6. Various badges of fraud existed in connection 
with the trust and the conveyance into trust; 
7. The conveyance into trust was actually 
fraudulent (intentionally). [Add. 2.] 
Thus, the reference to the actual fraud claim is clear and 
unequivocal. To emphasize the distinction from the constructive 
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the trial court's judgment will not be affected; and 
considerations of justice and public policy require it. See 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976); Zeman v. 
Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alas. 1985); 
Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Construction, Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 
540 P.2d 978, 985 (1975) . 
Respondents argue that the express reference in the Order 
to the actual fraud issue "is due to inadvertence" and "need not 
be accepted by this Court as correct." (Resp. Br. at 40-41.) 
This is a revolutionary proposition, especially coming from the 
party that drafted the Order. A final judgment is conclusive 
and binding on the parties and the courts until amended or 
reversed on appeal, and may not be arbitrarily disregarded. 
Respondents attempted to amend the Order, nearly four months 
after it was signed, on the basis of "clerical error." However, 
this Court properly denied the motion, leaving the Order as 
entered, and that ruling is now binding as the law of the case. 
See Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 
634, 636 (Utah App. 1987) (denial of motion to supplement record 
will not be reconsidered during same appeal). 
In sum, the actual fraud claim was raised and decided in 
the district court. The claim clearly raises material issues of 
fact that TSL is entitled to have adjudicated in a trial. 
Therefore, the summary judgment must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
order of summary judgment and either enter judgment for TSL 
under section 25-1-11 or remand the case for trial on all the 
issues. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE 5c BUSHNELL 
Norman J. Younker 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and 
correct copies of Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this 
11th day of May, 1988, to: 
Randall S. Feil 
Michael L. Ferrin 
Edwards & McCoy 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 
Attorneys for Trustee 
John Knapp Baird 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen 
215 South State Street, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for John N. Baird 
-18-
